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Abstract 
 
Priority setting and resource allocation across various health care functions is a critical 
issue in health policy and strategic decision making. As health resources are limited while 
there are so many health challenges to resolve, consumers and payers have to make difficult 
decisions about expenditure allocation. Our research focus on the (dis)agreement between 
citizens‟ preferences and actual public health expenditure across broad health care functions, 
on whether this (dis)agreement is persistent, on whether various demographic factors amplify 
this (dis)agreement and to derive useful implications for public health policies. Using survey 
data of 3,029 citizens in Greece for the year 2012 and employing logit estimation techniques, 
we analyzed the effect of demographic and other factors in shaping citizens‟ (dis)agreement 
with public health expenditure allocation. Our results demonstrate the important role of 
income, family members and residence in shaping citizens‟ preferences regarding health 
expenditure priorities in almost all health care functions, while other demographic factors 
such as job, age, gender and marital status do partly associate and play a significant role.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Developed countries spend considerable resources on health, though there are large 
variations in the levels and rates of growth in the health spending. In 2012 EU member states 
devoted an average 8.7% of their GDP to health spending, with Greece spending to be 9.3% 
(OECD, 2014).  According to recent estimates, spending on health will mount to 20% of GDP 
by 2050 in most of OECD countries (Drouin et al. 2008).  
Health systems are mostly funded either from general public revenues (e.g. Canada), or 
through a social security system with a separate budget and hypothecated taxes or 
contributions (e.g. Australia, France, Belgium, Japan and Germany). The health care system 
in Greece is financed by a mix of public and private resources. Public statutory financing is 
based on social insurance and tax (Economou, 2010). Greece has seen per capita health 
spending fall by 9% each year since the onset of the severe economic crisis in 2009. Health 
care rationing refers to mechanisms that are used to allocate health care resources. As 
(financial and health services related) resources are limited, to meet health system goals set by 
the World Health Organization (WHO, 2010) (WHO, 2015), consumers and payers demand 
greater accountability and have to make difficult decisions about which health functions to 
support (Dresser, 2009), while unequal provision of health services, rapid urbanization and 
civil conflict are documented, even when the same level of resources is allocated to public 
health across different countries (Ghobarah et al., 2004). Consequently, priority setting and 
resource allocation across different health functions is an issue of utmost importance for the 
present and for the years to come.  
Although citizens‟ preferences formation may shape resource allocation decisions in public 
and private health services delivery, there is still scant evidence on formal public involvement 
in health care priority setting and resource allocation activity (Mitton et al., 2009). Early 
debates on public involvement in healthcare decision-making have mainly aimed at 
strengthening the role of citizens as consumers in the healthcare sector, while later debates 
emphasized the role of citizen participation and competency as a means of improving the 
performance of the healthcare system (SVRKiG, 1997) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001). Among 
the recent attempts, the study of Church et al. (2002) examined the concept of citizen 
participation in the context of a series of basic questions through which decision-makers may 
draw some policy relevance. This study became a point of reference for an informed 
discussion of the possibilities for improved citizen participation in health-care decision-
making. Whitty et al. (2014) discussed the theoretical framework about the optimal approach 
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to access public preferences. Furthermore, Rosen and Karlberg (2002) compared the views of 
citizens and health-care decision-makers on health-care financing and revealed that the 
general public have high expectations on public health-care that do not fit with the decision-
makers‟ views on what should be offered. In a review of the empirical literature, Carpini, et al 
(2004) discussed the expectations, drawn from deliberative democratic theory, regarding the 
benefits (and, for some, pitfalls) assumed to derive from discursive participation and citizen 
engagement. According to Shaw et al. (2001), citizens require resource allocation decision in 
health to be informed by considerations of equity as well as efficiency. The study of Dolan 
and Shaw (2001) demonstrated that people are willing to sacrifice overall health benefits for a 
more equal distribution of health. Analogous evidence is documented in Schwappach (2003), 
where the vast majority of the respondents were willing to trade efficiency for a more equal 
distribution of resources. In similar vein, the study of Anderson et al. (2011) showed that 
there was strong support among respondents for giving equal priority to people regardless of 
their personal characteristics, while findings of other studies suggest that health care is 
informally rationed according to the age and sex of the patient (Brockmann, 2002). Finally, in 
Wiseman et al. (2003) respondents were asked whether they felt the preferences of general 
public should be used to inform priority setting. Results showed that the public 
overwhelmingly wanted their preferences to inform priority-setting decision in health care.   
The purpose our research was to study whether there is a (dis)agreement between citizens‟ 
preferences and actual public spending on a spectrum of health care functions, whether this 
(dis)agreement is persistent across broad health care programs, whether demographic factors 
of the participants amplify this (dis)agreement and to derive useful implications for public 
health care policies.  
We chose to study Greece for three main reasons: First, the out-of-pocket health 
expenditure is higher than anywhere else in the European Union either as a proportion of 
gross domestic product (GDP), or in per capita terms (OECD, 2014a). Second, Greece is in 
recession since 2009 and given tight budgets it is interesting to analyze the allocation of the 
limited health resources and whether citizens consent to this (Zavras, et al., 2012). At the 
same time, it can be argued that the financial crisis is a no easy way out, as elevated 
prevalence of certain diseases is already reported, although many researchers dispute over a 
causal association between recession and these health outcomes (Fragoulakis, et al, 2014). 
Finally, Greece, as also many of the Mediterranean countries, has demographics (low birth 
rate, high longevity, high unemployment, etc) that could consist a serious issue for the future 
of the health care sector (WHO, 2011). 
 
 
4 
Our results demonstrate the important role of income, family members and residence in 
shaping citizens‟ preferences regarding health financing priorities in almost all health core 
functions, while other demographic factors such as job, age, gender and marital status do 
partly associate and play a significant role. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
This section presents the research methodology and the data used, and describes the model 
and the estimation method. 
 
2.1 Data  
 
We conducted a survey taking a convenient sample of 3,029 persons (citizens) in Greece 
during the year 2012. Our research included a wide range of socio-economic characteristics of 
the participant citizens while the latter, are requested to allocate a hypothetical amount of 
money (i.e. 100€) in the System of Health Accounts (SHA) health care functions (ICHA-HC), 
but including also investment, though treated separately as Capital formation in health, to 
meet the total expenditure in health (current spending plus Capital formation) (OECD, 
Eurostat, WHO, 2011). Given the actual public spending on all equivalent health programs, 
we were able to calculate the size and the statistical significance of the difference between 
citizens‟ preferences and the public spending in health care in each health care function. 
Finally, we employed logit estimation techniques to study the effect of demographic factors in 
shaping citizens‟ (dis)agreement with public spending on health care.  
Table 1, below, presents a short description of these categories. 
 
Table 1: The classification of health care functions at the first-digit level 
Health Care functions  Description  
1 HC.1 Curative care 
The principal medical intent is to relieve symptoms of illness or injury, to reduce the 
severity of an illness or injury or to protect against exacerbation and/or complication of an 
illness which could threaten life. 
2 HC.2 Rehabilitative care 
Emphasis lies on improving the functional levels of the persons served and where the 
functional limitations are either due to a recent event of illness or injury or of a recurrent 
nature (regression or progression). 
3 HC.3 Long-term care (health) 
Ongoing health and nursing care given to in-patients who need assistance on a continuing 
basis due to chronic impairments and a reduced degree of independence and activities of 
daily living. 
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4 HC.4 Ancillary services Clinical laboratory, diagnostic imaging, patient transport and emergency rescue. 
5 HC.5 Medical goods 
Retail trade, fitting, maintaining and renting medical goods and appliances (public 
pharmacies, opticians, sanitary shops, teleshopping). 
6 HC.6 Preventive care 
Vaccination campaigns, school health services, prevention of (non)communicable diseases, 
occupational health care. 
7 
HC.7 Governance, and health 
system and financing 
administration 
Planning, management, regulation and collection of funds and handling of claims of the 
delivery system. 
8 HK Capital account 
Capital formation, education and training of health personnel, research and development, 
environmental health, food and hygiene. 
Source: International Classification of Health Accounts (OECD, Eurostat, WHO, 2011). 
 
The first five health care functions consist the major component of the personal health 
services and goods, while functions (6) and (7) form the major component of the public health 
(collective) services. The sum of functions (1) to (7) consist the total current expenditure on 
health. Finally, adding function (8) one gets the total health expenditure categories. 
A number of demographic factors were also requested and recorded from the participants 
such as Gender, Age, MaritalStatus, Job, Residence, Members and Income. The ordinal 
variables were classified according to Hellenic Statistical Authority classification standards. 
More specifically, Gender takes the value of 0 for male and 1 for female; Age consists of six 
intervals and takes the value of 1 for 15-24, 2 for 25-39, 3 for 40-54, 4 for 55-64, 5 for 65-79 
and 6 for >80 years old; MaritalStatus is a categorical variable and takes the value of 1 for 
singles, 2 for married, 3 for divorcees, 4 for separated and 5 for widows; Job represents that 
the employment status and is 1 for employed, 0 otherwise; Residence indicates the location of 
residency and is 1 for the prefecture of Athens, 0 otherwise; Members is 1 for a single 
individual, 2 for a married couple, 3 for a family with one child, and so on; Income level is 
grouped in eight classes and takes the value of 1 for <€750, 2 for €751-1100, 3 for €1101-
1450, 4 for €1451-1800, 5 for €1801-2200, 6 for €2201-2800, 7 for €2801-3500, 8 for >€3501 
(EL.STAT, 2014). 
Table 2, below, presents the summary statistics of our sample participants. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gender  3,029 0.503 0.500 0 1 
Age 3,029 2.925 1.427 1 6 
MaritalStatus 3,029 1.704 0.723 1 5 
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Job 3,029 0.686 0.464 0 1 
Residence 3,029 0.837 0.369 0 1 
Members 3,029 2.888 1.374 1 6 
Income 3,029 5.158 2.230 1 8 
 
As Table 2 shows, half of our sample participants are men, while the majority of the 
participants are between ages of 25 and 39. Participants, on average, have one child and live 
in the prefecture of Athens. Finally, they belong, on average, to middle income classes and 
about 70% of them are employed. 
Next, Table 3 presents the citizens‟ preferences to public health expenditure allocation, 
along with the actual public health spending among Health Care functions in Greece for 2012. 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics for health expenditure allocation (citizens‟ preferences vs. actual 
pubic spending) 
Variables 
Citizens’ preferences over 
 health expenditure allocation % 
Actual  
public 
health 
expenditure 
allocation 
% 
Obs Mean % Std. Dev. Min % Max % 
1. Curative care 3,029 17.520 8.867 0 60 64.23 
2. Rehabilitative care 3,029 12.157 6.564 0 75 0.63 
3. Long-term care 3,029 11.104 6.337 0 82 0.66 
4. Ancillary care 3,029 8.633 5.239 0 60 4.01 
5. Out-patients 3,029 9.095 5.833 0 50 26.55 
6. Prevention-Public health 3,029 15.331 8.960 0 79 1.68 
7. Administration 3,029 11.170 6.521 0 50 2.15 
8. Capital formation 3,029 14.992 11.078 0 98 0.09 
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2014 and own calculations 
 
Table 3 shows that Greek citizens allocated the hypothetical amount (on health 
expenditure) almost equally (about 12.5%) across all health categories. Furthermore, they 
allocated more than half of the budget (almost 60%) to personal health services and goods 
(variables 1-5), one quarter to collective health care services (variables 6-7), and the rest 
(15%) to capital formation (variable 8). The corresponding actual public expenditure in the 
aforementioned categories is 64.23, 0.63, 0.66, 4.01, 26.55, 1.68, 2.15 and 0.09, respectively. 
Information on the public‟s health expenditure in Greece for the year 2012 among Health 
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Care functions is calculated from OECD (2014b) data. 
Table 4, below, presents the correlations across Health Care functions (civilian‟s 
preferences) 
 
Table 4: Correlations across Health Care functions (citizens‟ preferences) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Curative care 1.000        
2. Rehabilitative care 0.148* 1.000       
3. Long-term care -0.068* 0.164* 1.000      
4. Ancillary care -0.114* -0.067* 0.071* 1.000     
5. Out-patients -0.153* -0.105* -0.098* 0.088* 1.000    
6. Prevention-Public health -0.265* -0.233* -0.214* -0.230* -0.131* 1.000   
7. Administration -0.271* -0.280* -0.213* -0.143* -0.085* 0.067* 1.000  
8. Capital formation -0.340* -0.364* -0.298* -0.159* -0.171* -0.198* -0.026 1.000 
Note: (*) indicate significance at 5% level of significance. 
 
As Table 4 shows, there is no strong correlation across Health Care functions, as the 
Pearson correlation coefficient is small (smaller than 0.3 in most cases). A stronger 
association, however, is demonstrated between the variables “capital formation” with 
“curative care” (0.34) and “rehabilitative care” (0.36). 
So far, we have discussed how citizens have expressed their preferences for allocating a 
hypothetical amount of money (budget) across major Health Care functions. This allocation 
reveals only the preferences of the citizens on how the government should allocate (and 
prioritize) the expenditure across these Health Care functions. Nevertheless, actual public 
health expenditure on these functions seems to be indeed very different.  
To statistically examine these differences, we performed the following test: The citizens‟ 
expenditure allocation preferences means were tested under the hypothesis that they are equal 
with the public health expenditure allocation means in every Health Care function (variable). 
We reject the null hypothesis at 95% interval confidence (a=5% level of significance) for all 
cases. Therefore, the means of the citizens‟ preferences are statistically different from the 
actual public expenditure means for all eight functions. Consequently, there seems to be some 
disagreement between citizens‟ preferences and actual public expenditure on health 
expenditure allocation. 
 Furthermore, our study aims to quantify this „disagreement‟. In doing so, we took the 
difference between the two stakeholders‟ (citizens and government) means, for each of the 
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eight variables (functions) and calculated the distribution of deviations. Then, we introduce a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 for „strong‟ disagreement between the two stakeholders 
for deviations higher than the 66th percentile of the distribution; 2 for „modest‟ agreement for 
deviations between the 3rd and 66th percentile of distribution; and finally, 3 for „almost‟ 
agreement for deviations below the 33rd percentile of the distribution. 
In the next section, we present our model, which aims to explain the sources of this 
(dis)agreement. 
 
2.2 Model 
 
The likelihood of a citizens‟ preferences to coincide with actual public health expenditure 
allocation can be described by an ordered logit model as follows: 
 
Pr(Y=c|Xi) = F(Xiβ), 
where, the endogenous variable Y is the degree of citizens‟ agreement with actual public 
health expenditure allocation and is an integer ranging from 1 (fully disagree) to 3 (fully 
agree); F is the standard logistic cumulative distribution function; and Χ is a set of covariates 
defined as: 
 
Xiβ = β0 + β1Genderi + β2Agei + β3MaritalStatusi + β4Jobi + β5Residencei +  
β6Membersi + β7Incomei + εi, εi ~ Logistic(0,1) 
 
where, Gender is a dummy variable that takes the values 0 and 1 if the citizen is male and 
female respectively; Age is the age of the citizen and is a dummy that takes the value of 1 (for 
ages 15 to 24), 2 (for ages 25 to 39), 3 (for ages 40 to 54), 4 (for ages 55 to 64),  5 (for ages 
65 to 79), and 6 (for ages >80 years old); MaritalStatus is a dummy and is 1 for singles, 2 for 
married, 3 for divorced,  4 for separated, and 5 for window; Job is a dummy for the 
employment status of the citizen and takes the values 0 for unemployed and 1 employed; City 
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the citizen lives in Athens and 0 otherwise; 
Members is the citizen‟s total family members (is 1 for a single person, 2 for a married 
couple, 3 for a family with one child, and so on; Income is a dummy for the income level of 
the citizen and is 1 for income level < €750, 2 for  €751-€1100, 3 for €1101-€1450, 4 for 
€1451-€1800, 5 for €1801-€2200, 6 for €2201-€2800, 7 for €2801-€3500, and 8 for income 
level > €3501. 
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The selection of the variables in Χi set can be justified by various studies (Anderson et al., 
2011) (Werntoft, Hallberg, and Edberg, 2007a) (Werntoft, Hallberg, and Edberg, 2007b) 
(Kyriopoulos et al. 2014) (WHO, 2010) (Diederich, Winkelhage, Wirsik, 2011) (Rosen and 
Karlberg, 2002) (Economou et al., 2004) 
3. Results 
 
Table 5, below, presents estimates of odds ratios for each one of the eight Health Care 
functions. One can read the odds ratios as follows: if the odd ratio, a, is bigger than 1 (a >1, 
then the probability of a citizen being satisfied with the actual public health expenditure 
allocation, i.e. Y =3 (full agreement), increases by (a-1)*100%, whereas the probability 
decreases by (1-a)*100%, if the odd ratio is smaller than one (a<1). 
 
 
10 
Table 5: Logit Estimates (odds ratios) for Various Health Care functions. 
(dependent variable: Deviation between citizens‟ preferences and actual public health expenditure) 
Odds Ratios 
Personal health services and goods Public (Collective) health care services Capital formation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Curative 
care 
Rehabilitative 
care 
Long-term care 
Ancillary 
care 
Out-patients 
Prevention -
Public Health 
Administration Capital formation 
Gender 
0.975 
(0.191) 
1.231*** 
(0.094) 
0.939 
(0.078) 
0.937 
(0.148) 
1.041 
(0.106) 
1.008 
(0.075) 
0.852* 
(0.083) 
1.194** 
(0.085) 
Age 
0.875 
(0.073) 
0.932* 
(0.031) 
1.026 
(0.037) 
1.067 
(0.077) 
0.936 
(0.043) 
0.976 
(0.032) 
0.980 
(0.044) 
1.091*** 
(0.034) 
MaritalStatus 
1.062 
(0.135) 
1.007 
(0.059) 
0.851** 
(0.055) 
1.105 
(0.165) 
0.989 
(0.090) 
0.997 
(0.062) 
1.191** 
(0.101) 
1.010 
(0.057) 
Job 
3.322*** 
(0.943) 
0.974 
(0.090) 
1.246** 
(0.124) 
1.260 
(0.227) 
0.884 
(0.105) 
0.917 
(0.082) 
0.758** 
(0.092) 
1.389*** 
(0.119) 
Residence 
0.610** 
(0.140) 
0.748*** 
(0.080) 
0.903 
(0.104) 
1.344 
(0.264) 
0.693*** 
(0.089) 
0.756*** 
(0.082) 
1.152 
(0.147) 
1.180* 
(0.115) 
Members 
1.041 
(0.076) 
0.917*** 
(0.029) 
0.910*** 
(0.030) 
1.008 
(0.066) 
1.146*** 
(0.049) 
1.170*** 
(0.036) 
1.094** 
(0.045) 
0.974 
(0.030) 
Income 
0.783*** 
(0.039) 
1.037* 
(0.020) 
1.061*** 
(0.022) 
1.051 
(0.041) 
0.937** 
(0.024) 
0.932*** 
(0.017) 
1.007 
(0.025) 
0.998 
(0.018) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.0614 0.0057 0.0072 0.0072 0.0117 0.0081 0.0075 0.0055 
Wald 50.13 26.45 29.40 12.85 34.25 43.02 23.72 31.22 
Obs 3,029 3,029 3,029 3,029 3,029 3,029 3,029 3,029 
           Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; (***), (**), (*) indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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According to Table 5, all demographic factors explain the deviations between citizens‟ 
preferences with actual public health expenditure allocation. Among the demographic factors, 
Members, Residence and Income appear to be statistically significant in the majority (5 out of 
8) of Health Care functions. The factor Job is statistically significant in almost half of the 
Health Care functions, Gender is statistically significant in three functions and finally Age and 
MaritalStatus are statistically significant in only two functions. 
More specifically, the number of family members (Members) has a positive and 
statistically significant role in the majority of Health Care functions. For instance, for the 
category “medical goods and services dispensed on out-patients” (5), when an additional 
member in a participant‟s life, increases the probability of a citizens‟ preference to be in 
agreement with public health expenditure allocation increases by 14.6% [=(1.146-1)*100%]. 
Similar positive effect is also documented for the functions “public health-prevention” (6) and 
“administration” (7), where the probability of a citizen to be satisfied with public health 
expenditure allocation increases by 17% and 9.4%, respectively. However, the opposite holds 
for the categories of “rehabilitative care” (2) and “long-term care” (3) in the case when a 
citizen‟s family is getting bigger, then his/her probability of being satisfied with public health 
expenditure allocation decreases by 8% and 9%, respectively. 
Furthermore, the income class of a participant (Income) has a positive and statistically 
significant association with the function “long-term care” (3). As the citizen‟s level of income 
increases and changes income class, the probability of being satisfied increases by 6.1%. For 
the functions “curative care” (1), “medical goods dispensed to out-patients” (5) and 
“prevention-public health” (6), the income effect is negative. That means the higher the level 
of income of a citizen is, the probability of being in agreement with public‟s spending 
decreases by 21.7%, 6.3% and 6.8%, respectively. 
Where the civilian resides (Residence) also plays a role in a civilian‟s preferences and 
perception of health rationing. This factor is statistically associated with the health categories 
of “curative care” (column 1), “rehabilitative care” (column 2), “medical goods dispensed to 
out-going patients” (column 5), “health categories of prevention-public health” (6) and 
“capital formation” (column 8). In the latter case, there is a positive association, with the 
probability of a civilian being in fully agreement with public health expenditure allocation to 
increase by 18% if the citizen moves from the rest of the country to the prefecture of Athens. 
In all other aforementioned cases, the Residence effect is negative and the average decrease of 
a citizen‟s probability of being in fully agreement with the actual public health expenditure 
allocation is 30%. 
The employment status of a citizen is also an important factor for shaping the degree of 
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(dis)agreement between public and his/her own hypothetical expenditure allocation. The 
estimate of Job is statistical significant in four functions, namely “curative care” (1), “long-
term care” (3), “administration” (7) and “capital formation” (8). More specifically, there is a 
positive association with respect to “curative care”. Positive is also the Job effect for the 
functions “long-term care” (3) and “capital formation” (8). When a citizen is employed, the 
probability of being in fully agreement with the actual public health expenditure allocation 
increases by 24.6% and 38.9%, respectively compared to an unemployed person. The 
opposite effect is documented for the “administration”, where the holding of a job leads to a 
decrease of the probability of in fully agreement by 24.2%. 
The factor Gender seems to be statistically important only for the function “rehabilitative 
care” (2) and “capital formation” (8). In both variables, there is a positive and strong effect (at 
1% and 5% level of significance, respectively), while a negative but with marginal statistical 
significance (at 10% level of significance) is documented for the function “administration” 
(7). More particularly, women are more likely to be in agreement with actual public health 
expenditure allocation (about 23.1% and 19.6% respectively for the functions 2 and 8) 
compared to a man.  
Further, the demographic factor of Age seems to be statistically significant only for the 
function “capital formation” (8). We find that as the citizen grow older, the likelihood of 
being in fully agreement with actual public health expenditure allocation increases by 9.1%. A 
marginal significance is also demonstrated for the function “rehabilitative care” (2). 
Finally, the marital status (MaritalStatus), which plays an important role in two functions 
that of “long-term care” (3) and “capital formation” (8), is a categorical variable, i.e., there is 
no intrinsic ordering to the categories, and, therefore, a marginal effect analysis is required 
and performed in Table 6 in this section below. 
Table 6 below, presents the marginal effect analysis for MaritalStatus and for the functions 
in which appear to be statistically significant. 
 
Table 6: Marginal Effects Analysis 
Marginal effect  Long-term care Administration 
MaritalStatus   
1 (single) 0.747 
(0.015) 
0.795 
(0.014) 
2 (married) 0.718 
(0.013) 
0.843 
(0.010) 
3 (divorced) 0.667 
(0.043) 
0.795 
(0.039) 
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4 (separated) 0.620 
(0.052) 
0.886 
(0.033) 
5 (widow) 0.842 
(0.100) 
0.772 
(0.133) 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The marginal effect analysis of the marital status effect can be read as follows: the 
probability of a citizen being satisfied because the government met his/her preferences with 
respect to public health expenditure of long-term care category is 74.7% among those who are 
single, 71.8% among those who are married, 66.7% among those who are divorced, 62% 
among those who are separated and 84.2% among widowers. With respect to the function of 
administration, the probabilities are 79.5%, 84.3%, 79.5%, 88.6% and 77.2%, respectively. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Aging population, shifting demographics, rising unemployment and financial strain, 
increasing health care costs and reductions in tax revenues are contributing to deeply stress 
the Greek healthcare system, while decreased disposable income has made access to 
healthcare more difficult for many households (Eurofound, 2014). The citizens‟ extremely 
low level of satisfaction from the Greek Health System (Health Consumer Powerhouse, 
2015), reflects the impact of economic crisis and austerity in health care and in the social 
policy in general (Kyriopoulos et al, 2014). 
In this context, policymakers and service providers are faced with the challenge of better 
allocate the available (scarce) resources. Priority setting and better allocation in health care 
expenditure is being introduced as a mean to overcome these problems and to provide a fair 
distribution of resources (Rosen and Karlberg, 2002). Health care expenditure is both 
determined exogenously, through non-system external pressures, which may occur at the 
macroeconomic level, and endogenously, through factors that impact directly on expenditure 
and are determined mostly at the microeconomic level through a complex set of relationships 
(Kanavos, 1999). A common approach to policy formulation in the face of resource 
constraints is to adopt the framework of societal health benefits maximization through 
reliance on the cost-effectiveness of health services provision, though does not always seem 
to be socially accepted (Hadorn, 1991). On the other hand, the Accountability for 
Reasonableness (A4R) framework (Daniels & Sabin, 2008) (Ham & Robert, 2003) states that 
power differences must be mitigated to facilitate effective participation of diverse members in 
the decision making context for priority setting in health care financing. Finally, Botelho, et 
 
 
14 
al. (2013) found that although citizens wish to be consulted, they believe doctors should play 
the most important role on health expenditure allocation and rationing decisions. 
In our research we found that, the number of family members seems to play a significant 
role shaping the citizens‟ agreement with respect to actual public health expenditure 
allocation, in the majority of health care functions. The effect, however, of this demographic 
factor, is not the same in all cases. “Collective health services”, for example, have a great 
impact on children, since vaccination is essential. The same is true with the “medical goods 
dispensed to out-patients” function since it includes public pharmacies and sanitary shops. In 
contrast, the “long-term and rehabilitative care” is not highly ranked in parents‟ preferences, 
finding present in other study for Greece (Theodorou et al, 2010).  
Other demographic factors such as job, age, gender and marital status do partly associate 
and play a significant role. These findings are consistent with other studies where these 
criteria for prioritizing medical services, have also controversial results (Diederich, Swait and 
Wirsik, 2012) (Werntoft and Edberg, 2009) (Kanavos, 1999) (Werntoft, Hallberg and Edberg, 
2007a) (Werntoft, Hallberg and Edberg, 2007b). However, other findings (Fotaki, 2013) 
(Theodorou et al, 2010) (Broqvist and Garpenby, 2014), indicate that personal characteristics 
such as gender, age, education as context specific of choices in health.  
The importance of income in “collective health services” is also reasonable (Economou et 
al, 2004). The higher the income class of a citizen, the lower his/her hypothetical spending on 
this function will be. Civilians would prefer more expenditure to be allocated to the functions 
of “curative care” and to “medical goods dispensed to out-patients.” This is also quite 
reasonable as these functions are very important in daily life, in contrast to the “long-term 
nursing care” function, which usually include chronic impairment. Citizens tend to focus 
more on present needs and less on future or expected chronic situations (Werntoft, Hallberg 
and Edberg, 2007b) (Hauck, Smith and Goddard, 2004).  
The preferences of citizens, who live outside the prefecture of Athens, seem to be in 
disagreement with actual public health expenditure for the majority of health care functions. 
We must not forget that mechanisms for needs assessment and priority-setting are 
underdeveloped in the Greek Health System and, as a consequence, the regional distribution 
of health resources is unequal (Economou, 2010). So, our estimate on the variable Capital 
formation, which shows that the citizens tend to agree with that reality, is consistent with 
similar findings as appear in the Coelho (2013) study. 
Finally, one would expect an employed civilian to allocate more resources to all categories 
that potential directly related to his/her medical treatment and the utility s/he drives currently 
or in the future for the medical system and its functions (Sibbald, et al, 2010). Such health 
 
 
15 
services are those of “curative care”, which is covered by his/her insurance, or “long-term 
nursing care”, which may cover the possibility of a labor accident, whereas spending on the 
category “regulation and collection of funds” would not rank high in his/her preferences 
(Diederich, Winkelhag and Wirsik, 2011) (Schreier et al, 2011). 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Government and citizens ranks alongside health as one of the general topic are most interested 
in. But still there are wide disparities between the level and the means of participation in the 
decision making process. Priority setting and resource allocation across various health care 
functions is a critical issue in health policy and strategic decision making. As health resources 
are limited while there are so many health challenges to resolve, consumers and payers have 
to make difficult decisions about expenditure allocation. 
Our research unveiled the significant disagreement between citizens‟ preferences and actual 
public health expenditure across all health care functions, focusing on various demographic 
factors and deriving useful implications for public health policies. 
As a result, government should encourage the citizens‟ participation, by introducing policies 
of empowering the knowledge dissemination and democratization in the decision making 
process. 
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